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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF ONLINE INCENTIVIZED REVIEWS
ON ORGANIC REVIEW RATINGS
by
Yoonsun Jeong

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2020
Under the Supervision of Professor Amit Bhatnagar and Professor Sanjoy Ghose
As online reviews become a major factor in the consumer decision-making process, firms
have started seeking ways to create and leverage reviews to help achieve their marketing
objectives. One productive strategy to generate reviews is to incentivize or reward customers to
write reviews. While such a strategy certainly augments the number of reviews, it naturally raises
questions of how unbiased such reviews are, and how such a "bias," if it exists, affects potential
customers. Complicating the issue further, such incentives can be provided by either the vendor
or the platform, which may affect the nature of "bias."
To understand the marketing value of such reviews, this research examines the effects of
online incentivized reviews on subsequent organic reviews. First, we investigate whether
incentivized reviews are biased compared to organic reviews. Specifically, we find that vendor–
initiated incentivized reviews are more favorable whereas platform–initiated incentivized
reviews are more critical. Second, we study how incentivized reviews affect future organic
review ratings. The findings suggest that vendor (platform) –initiated incentivized reviews
reduce (increase) the subsequent organic review ratings. Moderating effects of helpfulness of
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incentivized reviews and product type are significant. These findings offer important insights
about the effectiveness of incentivized reviews.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In a continuously changing world where marketers are racing to find newer and newer
methods of communicating with their customers (e.g., podcast, video on demand, webisodes, and
streaming media), the one constant is consumers continued trust in the opinion of another
consumer. The fear that the impersonal electronic world would replace the traditional word of
mouth has been laid to rest by the online persona of traditional word of mouth – online reviews.
Not surprisingly, there is preponderance of statistics to show the continued relevance of usergenerated content (e.g., customer reviews) in the consumer decision process (TurnTo 2017). As
per an industry study (Nielsen 2015), 70% of global consumers trust online reviews and 90% of
those who read online reviews state that their buying decisions are influenced by online reviews.
Most shoppers begin their online journey by searching for product reviews and place increasing
reliance upon such reviews when making final purchasing decisions (Dimensional Research
2013).
Given the widely recognized importance of product reviews for consumer decision
making, firms have been actively seeking ways to encourage customers to post reviews and share
their experiences with other potential customers. Firms such as Amazon.com, Macy’s, and
Walmart are known to regularly incentivize their customers to write a review by offering free or
discounted products. Reviews written by customers who avail themselves of these incentives are
called incentivized reviews, and they are seamlessly interspersed between regular organic
reviews in the review profile of products. Both organic and incentivized reviews are used in
1

determining the overall product rating that is presented to all site visitors. The proliferation of
incentivized reviews has led to calls for a careful study of their effectiveness in consumer
decision making (Dost et al. 2019; Rosario, Valck, and Sotgiu 2020; You, Vadakkepatt, and
Joshi 2015). A recent meta-analysis of electronic word of mouth (eWOM) and a review paper on
eWOM identify the lack of knowledge regarding incentivized reviews as a research gap
(Rosario, Valck, and Sotgiu 2020; You, Vadakkepatt, and Joshi 2015). Unlike organic reviewers,
who are intrinsically motivated to share information with others, incentivized reviewers are
motivated and encouraged to post reviews by rewards offered by firms. The financial
motivations to write an incentivized review may affect how the content is perceived by potential
customers and thus may have an impact on its effectiveness.
The incentivized reviewers could potentially write their true opinions about the product –
positive or negative; however, in practice incentivized reviews tend to be overwhelmingly biased
in favor of the product being rated (Petrescu et al. 2018). Using a sample of 151,904 reviews
across seven categories posted on Amazon.com, we find that incentivized reviews are on an
average .415 points higher than organic reviews on a 5-point scale.
The growing number of incentivized reviews can artificially inflate the product rankings,
leading to ethical issues since one can convincingly argue that consumers are being “bribed” to
write positive reviews. To instill confidence in their customers, some retailers impose the
condition that incentivized reviewers disclose their affiliation with the vendor in question in the
text of their review. It is easy to see something like “I received this product for free or at a
discount in exchange for my honest and unbiased review” while browsing reviews at online
retailers’ websites. Figures 1 and 2 show examples of incentivized reviews at Amazon.com.
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Figure 1
An Example of a Vendor-Initiated Incentivized Review
for a Beauty Product on Amazon.com

Figure 2
An Example of a Platform-Initiated Incentivized Review
for a Beauty Product on Amazon.com

In fact, incentivized reviews without this disclosure could be subject to sanction by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (Fair 2019). Unfortunately, such a disclosure does not address
the problem completely. While astute consumers can ignore incentivized reviews, the harsh
reality is that the majority of consumers cannot distinguish between organic and incentivized
3

reviews (Sterling 2018). Furthermore, it is impossible for anyone to ascertain the true overall
product rating without the contribution of incentivized reviews. For consumers looking for
accurate, unbiased product ratings before making a purchase, this can be a significant challenge.
To address the ethical questions surrounding incentivized reviews, some retailers have
responded by prohibiting incentivized reviews. In a much-publicized move, Amazon.com
banned all incentivized reviews from its platform on September 19, 2016 (Weise 2016). Several
other firms, such as Google, Yelp, and Better Business Bureau, followed suit by banning all
kinds of incentivized reviews. However, due to the enormous number of reviews posted daily
(e.g., Amazon.com sells about 600 million products, each with hundreds of reviews), catching all
the incentivized reviews is nearly impossible. A recent Wall Street Journal study found more
than a third of online reviews on major websites, such as Amazon.com, Walmart, and Sephora,
to be fake, a category which includes incentivized reviews (Kapner, 2019). Last year, a
Washington Post investigation of Amazon.com 18 months after the ban found that many reviews
were paid for (Dwoskin and Timberg 2018). The consequence of the Internet been so permeated
with 5-star praise is that consumers are losing trust in online reviews (Dolan 2019).
The more intriguing aspect in the development of incentivized reviews is that
Amazon.com did not ban all kinds of incentivized reviews. While Amazon.com discontinued
online reviews that were incentivized by the vendors selling products on its platform, it retained
online reviews where the incentive is provided by Amazon.com itself. Amazon.com calls these
reviews “Vine reviews.” To differentiate between these two kinds of reviews, we term reviews
where the incentive is provided by the vendor as vendor-initiated incentivized reviews and the
other as platform-initiated incentivized reviews. While Amazon.com has banned the former, it
continues to support the latter. For our data, we interestingly find that the ratings of the platform-
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initiated incentivized reviews are lower than those of the organic reviews. This is the opposite of
what is found for vendor-initiated incentivized reviews.
It appears that incentivized reviews will continue to exist since some businesses
obviously believe in their effectiveness despite the constant threat of reputational and/or financial
penalties. However, is it a good long-term business strategy to incentivize reviewers? This is the
central question that this research aims to answer. We tap into the expectation-confirmation
theory to hypothesize that the answer will depend on who provides the incentive: vendor or
platform. We also develop additional hypotheses about the role of product type and helpfulness
of the incentivized review in determining the effectiveness of incentivized reviews.
We test our hypotheses on 180,267 reviews for 2,817 products across seven product
categories obtained from Amazon.com. We find that vendor (platform) – initiated incentivized
reviews have a higher (lower) rating than the average rating of the previously posted organic
reviews for the product. This in turn lowers (increases) the subsequent organic review ratings.
Further, we show that the effect is more pronounced for experience products than for search
products. We also find that the effect is less pronounced if the incentivized review is viewed as
more helpful.
In the following sections, we first discuss related studies on online WOM and product
sampling to develop the theoretical foundation of this research. We then examine the nature of
biases in incentivized reviews and provide empirical evidence. After presenting the
corresponding hypotheses, we sequentially describe the data, the model, and the empirical
results. We conclude with a discussion of the findings, managerial implications, and directions
for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Most research into online product reviews has investigated relationships between
customer reviews and different marketing outcomes (Chen, Wu, and Yoon 2004; Chevalier and
Mayzlin 2006; Duan, Gu, and Whinston, 2008; Moe and Trusov 2011; Resnick and Zeckhauser
2002; Sun 2012). Some important research from this area is highlighted first in this section. A
few recent studies have focused specifically on the impact of previous reviews on subsequent
ones from a social dynamics standpoint (Godes and Silva 2012; Li and Hitt 2008). Our empirical
analysis also involves studying how incentivized reviews affect subsequent organic review
ratings, and therefore empirical studies that relate online reviews to subsequent reviews are
reviewed next. There is a stream of literature on product sampling that has parallels to
incentivized reviews, and therefore, some relevant papers from the product sampling field are
also reviewed.

2.1 Online Review Rating
Prior research on consumer online reviews has concentrated on establishing the causal
relationship between the average rating and sales and reported mixed results (Chen, Wu, and
Yoon 2004; Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Duan, Gu, and Whinston, 2008; Moe and Trusov
2011; Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002; Sun 2012). For example, Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002)
examine a large data set from eBay and find that sellers with better reputations are more likely to
succeed in selling their products. Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) find that an improvement in a
book’s reviews leads to an increase in its sales, with one-star reviews having a greater impact on
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sales than five-star reviews. Sun (2012) demonstrates that a higher standard deviation in review
ratings increases sales rank when the average rating is lower than 4.1. Chintagunta, Gopinath,
and Venkataraman (2010) find the valence to be an important predictor of box office
performance
In contrast, Liu (2006) studies movie reviews and finds that the valence of reviews is not
correlated with the weekly movie sales. Duan, Gu, and Whinston (2008) also show that online
consumer review ratings do not affect movie sales after accounting for endogeneity of user
reviews and product heterogeneity. Interestingly, both studies find that the number of consumer
reviews has a positive impact on sales. These results suggest that online reviews have little
persuasive effect on consumer purchase decisions but strong awareness effect.
Previous studies have examined the factors that drive consumers to voluntarily share their
experiences with others by contributing online reviews. Wu and Huberman (2008) argue that
customers are less likely to post positive reviews for highly-rated products since posting a review
is costly. Reviewers are motivated to post reviews by the expected impact their reviews will have
on the average rating. This implies that reviewers are more likely to post reviews if they have
opinions that differ greatly from the average rating and/or when there are fewer reviews
available. Therefore, a new review tends to be substantially different from the existing reviews in
order to have an impact. Moe and Schweidel (2012) show how previously posted ratings affect
an individual’s posting behavior in terms of (a) whether to write a review and (b) what rating to
assign. They find that a positive rating environment increases posting incidence, whereas a
negative rating environment discourages posting. These studies provide strong evidence that
reviewers are influenced by previous reviewers, strengthening our conviction that incentivized
reviews will influence subsequent reviews.
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2.2 Impact of Reviews on Subsequent Reviews
In theory, it is assumed that posted reviews reflect individuals’ post-purchase evaluation
of the product and are supposed to be independent of the experience of other reviewers.
However, a few studies show that an individual’s publicly expressed opinion can be influenced
by the opinions of others and does not necessarily reflect the individual’s true unbiased,
independent product evaluation (Godes and Silva 2012; Li and Hitt 2008; Moe and Trusov
2011). Schlosser (2005) finds evidence that reviewers tend to negatively adjust their opinions
after reading a negative review. This is because reviewers likely view the person posting a
negative review as intelligent, which triggers concerns about the quality and social outcomes of
their review. As a result, even when consumers have positive experiences with a product, they
adjust their ratings downward in order to avoid giving the impression that they have low
standards or are indiscriminate. Further, Schlosser (2005) discusses a multiple-audience effect,
that is, people adjust their message to offer a more balanced opinion (Fleming et al. 1990) when
facing a heterogeneous audience.
A few recent studies have examined the dynamic processes of online ratings and found
that ratings exhibit systematic patterns over time. Specifically, the valence of ratings on average
tends to decrease over time (Godes and Silva 2012; Li and Hitt 2008). Li and Hitt (2008) argue
that customers who purchase a product early in the product life cycle have significantly different
tastes and preferences than those who purchase later in the cycle. Most of the initial product
ratings are provided by the early customers but consumed by later customers. This in turn
increases the level of dissatisfaction since later customers purchase based on the reviews
provided by early customers who have different tastes. In contrast, Godes and Silva (2012)
demonstrate that the valence of ratings decreases with the ordinality of the rating rather than
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time. This is because more reviews lead to more purchase errors, leading to greater dissimilarity
between past reviewers and potential customers, which then lowers future ratings. Due to the
importance of time and ordinality, our empirical model controls for both while measuring the
impact of previous reviews on subsequent ones.

2.3 Product Sampling
Marketers are increasingly adopting product sampling (seeded marketing) as a strategy to
drive brand awareness, increase sales, and build customer loyalty. Seeded marketing campaigns
involve firms sending products to selected customers and encouraging them to generate WOM in
return. This form of marketing communications strategy is also known as “buzz,” or a viral
marketing campaign.
Research on online seeded marketing tends to focus on the impact of product sampling on
future sales (Hu et al. 2010; Yao et al. 2017; Zhang, Goh, and Lin 2017). For example, Yao et al.
(2017) show that offering samples of physical products online increases sales of the products,
with the impact being greater for popular brands. In the context of digital products, Hu et al.
(2010) examine the effect of offering free samples of music and find that product sampling
reduces product uncertainty, leading to better sales. They also find that the impact of online
reviews on sales is lower for products with a sampling option than those without.
Zhang, Goh, and Lin (2017) examine the impact of product sampling on the sales of other
products in the same store and the sales of the same product in other stores. They find that
sampling of a search (experience) product increases (decreases) the sales of other products in the
same store, whereas sampling of experience products increases the sales of the same product in
another store. Chae et al. (2016) also study the spillover effects of seeded marketing in online
9

contexts. They find that seeding increases conversations about the product among non-selected
consumers and decreases WOM about other products from the same brand and about
competitors’ products in the same category as the focal product. While this literature has
explored the effect of product sampling on online reviews, there are no studies that have
examined the impact of incentivized reviews (a consequence of product sampling) on organic
reviews.
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CHAPTER 3
BIASES IN INCENTIVIZED REVIEWS

Marketing communication is a major source for influencing consumer attitudes and
behavior. This has been true in the non-digital age and continues to be true in today’s digital
environment. An important classification in marketing communication is the distinction between
media (or marketer) generated content (MGC) and consumer generated content (CGC).
In the non-digital age, advertising by companies over mass media (e.g., TV, Print) made
up much of MGC while word of mouth (e.g., by friends, family, and others) was the common
manifestation (Day 1971; Sheth 1971) of CGC. Past research has shown that word of mouth is
more effective than mass media advertising in terms of influencing potential consumers. Day
(1971) mentions that word of mouth is more impactful because the source is viewed as more
reliable. Trust in the source of communication is of vital importance in the non-digital age. Word
of mouth also influences consumer expectations (Zeithaml et. al. 1993).
In today’s increasingly digital environment, both MGC and CGC permeate the market,
each offering information about products and services to individuals who browse the web. MGC
takes various forms such as banner advertising, or Google’s Adwords type advertising that is
related directly to usage of search engines by individuals. CGC takes many forms including
blogs, forums, specific applications like Facebook or Twitter, and also online reviews.
Marketer generated content in company websites provides information about product
specifications and uses. CGC in the form of online reviews provides feedback about the actual
experiences of consumers with brand items in almost innumerable number of product categories
11

and subcategories. The growth in the quantum of online reviews has truly been quite
phenomenal.
The rise of user-generated content (e.g., customer reviews) in e-commerce is fast
outranking all other forms of marketing when it comes to influencing the consumer decision
process (TurnTo 2017). In recent years, the number of consumers who read online reviews and
contribute their opinions to review forums has dramatically increased (PowerReviews 2019).
Most shoppers will begin their online journey by searching for product reviews. Consumers are
increasingly reliant upon online reviews when making purchasing decisions (Dimensional
Research 2013). According to Kee (2008), 64% of the respondents in Forrester Research’s online
survey want to read reviews and check ratings on the e-commerce websites they visit and 68% of
online shoppers read at least four reviews before making a purchase. In fact, 70 percent of global
consumers trust online reviews (Nielson 2015) and 90% of those who read online reviews state
that their buying decisions are influenced by online reviews (Dimensional Research 2013).
Just as traditional CGC in the form of word of mouth is considered trustworthy and thus
shapes consumer expectations, we believe that this should also be the case with for today’s most
pervasive CGC source — online reviews. Hoeffler (2018) mentions that consumers value
opinions from one another more than they value communication that emanates from marketers.
Hoeffler (2018) also states that shoppers who interact with CGC such as online reviews, are
more than twice as likely to convert compared to those who do not interact. Gesenhues (2013)
says that in a survey, a large proportion of surveyed consumers indicate that online reviews
influence their buying decisions. It seems obvious to conclude then that online reviews strongly
affect consumer expectations and behavior. How online customer reviews are helpful for the
consumer purchasing decision has been studied by Mudambi and Schuff (2010). A meta-analysis
12

of how online reviews affect retail sales also throws light on this important aspect of such
reviews (Floyd et al. 2014).
The vast majority of online reviews are written by “organic” consumers who provide
feedback about their actual experiences with brands in a variety of product categories and
subcategories. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the content of organic reviews provides
accurate information about the true quality of the products purchased and reviewed.
Like other forms of CGCs, online organic reviews of the digital age are also considered
to provide reliable and trustworthy information. Online organic reviews are thus helpful while
making consumer purchase decisions. Feedback from the trade (Hoeffler 2018; Gesenhaus 2013)
and academic studies (Mudambi and Schuff 2010; Floyd et al. 2014) confirm the existence of
this trend. Hoeffler (2018) also describes a study where a majority of their 3,000 respondents
find organic reviews and incentivized reviews to be equally credible. Assuming this pattern
generalizes to the greater general population, we propose that given the trust in incentivized
online reviews, the review contents will have considerable impact on shaping the expectations of
potential consumers.
Hence, we would expect that readers would typically find incentivized reviews to be
worthy of trust. If incentivized reviews happen to be biased or inaccurate, individuals who buy
and experience the product after reading the incentivized reviews, will be disillusioned. This will
happen because consumer expectations (as built up by the incentivized reviews) about the
supposedly true product quality will not match the actual product quality experienced by the
product buyers. In this chapter, we describe the nature of biases in incentivized reviews and
provide empirical evidence.
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3.1 The Nature of Biases in Incentivized Reviews
Although online reviews written by “organic” consumers form the vast majority of online
reviews, there is a form of such reviews called “incentivized reviews” that are different in nature
from organic or non-incentivized reviews. Incentivized reviews are posted by individuals who
are usually incentivized by manufacturers or retailers who offer them free samples or products
free of charge in exchange for their online reviews (Petrescu et al. 2018). There are two types of
incentivized reviews—(1) vendor-initiated incentivized reviews and (2) platform-initiated
incentivized reviews.
Vendor-initiated incentivized reviewers are believed to highly praise the product even
though they claim that their reviews are unbiased and honest (Petrescu et al. 2018). There are
three possible explanations for the higher ratings of vendor-initiated incentivized reviews. First,
the norm of reciprocity is a social convention that requires people to return a favor when the
favor is given by others (Falk and Fischbacher 2006; Gouldner 1960). This suggests that
incentivized reviewers may feel obligated to provide positive reviews in return for free products.
Second, vendors prefer choosing reviewers who tend to write positive reviews since they will be
more likely to provide favorable reviews. Third, many incentivized reviewers gain reputations
for consistently posting positive reviews and ratings in order to make sure that they will receive
more free products in the future. Therefore, we expect that vendor-initiated reviews are more
positively biased when compared to organic reviews.
Unlike vendor-initiated incentivized reviews, platform-initiated incentivized reviews are
initiated by the platform that provides a platform for the vendors. In this case, the firm operating
the platform (e.g., Amazon.com, Google) selects participants to receive free products in

14

exchange for posting reviews, and the reviewers typically have no contact with the vendor. This
allows the platform to avoid reviewers posting upward biased reviews.
The platform-initiated incentivized reviews are generated by experts who are selected by
the platform. Prior studies have found that expert reviewers are more likely to express negative
opinions (Goes, Lin, and Yeung 2014; Moe and Schweidel 2012; Schlosser 2005). According to
Moe and Schweidel (2012), highly active reviewers are more negative in their evaluations. In an
experimental setting, Schlosser (2005) demonstrates that reviewers strive to differentiate their
reviews, and negative reviews are more differentiated because negative reviewers are perceived
as more intelligent (Amabile 1983; Amabile and Glazebrook 1982). Goes, Lin, and Yeung
(2014) suggest that reviewers are more likely to post a negative rating when they receive higher
social recognition. They argue that as reviewers become more popular and gain higher social
recognition from other customers, they are more likely to provide a negative rating because
posting negative reviews makes them look like experts. Expert reviewers or highly active
reviewers are more likely to post negative opinions about products. Thus, we expect that
platform-initiated incentivized reviews have lower ratings than organic reviews.
In the following section, we test whether such biases exist in incentivized reviews and
provide empirical evidence.

3.2 Empirical Evidence
3.2.1 Data
We collect data from Amazon.com’s Web Service (AWS). Amazon.com was one of the
first online stores to allow consumers to post product reviews in 1995, and it remains one of the
most important resources for consumers looking to make informed purchase decisions. For each
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product, consumers can rate the product on a discrete five-star rating scale, write a review, and
vote on the helpfulness of other reviews. On each product’s page, Amazon.com displays the
overall product rating (on a scale of 5), with the percentage of reviews per star and stacks them
sequentially next to customer reviews. The customer reviews can be sorted by helpfulness or
recency.
We use product reviews posted from October 1, 2004 to August 31, 2015. We collect
reviews from three categories: (a) beauty, (b) grocery, and (c) health and personal care. For each
product, we obtain all the posted review texts, dates, ratings, and votes on helpfulness.
On Amazon.com, vendor-initiated incentivized reviews are required to include a
disclosure indicating that the reviewer was provided the product for free or at a discounted price
in exchange for a review. Therefore, vendor-initiated incentivized reviews explicitly include
some variants of the following disclosure statement: “I received this product for free or at a
discount in exchange for my honest and unbiased review.” To detect all the variants of such
statements, we first select any review that includes the following variants of disclosure
statements in a single sentence of the review text:
[given | provided | received | sent] &
[discount | free] &
[in exchange | in trade] &
[authentic | fair | genuine | honest | impartial | unbiased] &
[experience | feedback | opinion | review | trial].
A human coder then manually inspects each review and excludes any non-incentivized
reviews that happen to match the above disclosure expression. For platform-initiated incentivized
reviews, we select reviews that include a label, “Amazon Vine Review,” which indicates that the

16

review was written for the Vine program. These considerations result in a data set of 664,183
reviews, with 180,501 reviews from 2,319 vendor-initiated incentivized products, and 483,682
reviews from 3,052 platform-initiated incentivized products.

3.2.2 Results
Tables 1 and 2 present the faction of star ratings for vendor-initiated incentivized reviews
and platform-initiated incentivized reviews, respectively. We find that vendor-initiated
incentivized reviews have more five-star rating reviews (80.35% versus 68.67%) and fewer onestar rating reviews than organic reviews for the same products (.75% versus 6.66%). Contrary to
the distributions of the vendor-initiated incentivized review ratings, platform-initiated
incentivized reviews include far less extreme positive (five-star) ratings (80.35% versus
38.09%). Overall, we find that vendor (platform) – initiated incentivized reviews have much
higher (lower) ratings than organic reviews.
Table 1
Fraction of Star Ratings of Vendor-Initiated Incentivized Reviews
Beauty

Grocery

Health and Personal Care

Overall

Star Rating

Organic

Incentivized

Organic

Incentivized

Organic

Incentivized

Organic

Incentivized

1 star (%)

6.03

.91

3.61

1.80

8.34

.51

6.66

.75

2 stars (%)

3.72

.66

3.08

.60

4.39

.70

3.91

.68

3 stars (%)

6.30

2.89

5.52

2.99

6.38

3.17

6.24

3.04

4 stars (%)

14.29

16.65

14.10

13.17

14.92

14.27

14.52

15.18

5 stars (%)

69.66

78.90

73.69

81.44

65.96

81.36

68.67

80.35
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Table 2
Fraction of Star Ratings of Platform-Initiated Incentivized Reviews
Beauty

Grocery

Health and Personal Care

Overall

Star Rating

Organic

Incentivized

Organic

Incentivized

Organic

Incentivized

Organic

Incentivized

1 star (%)

8.07

2.01

6.56

2.66

9.05

2.83

8.17

2.46

2 stars (%)

5.32

6.00

4.53

7.36

5.29

6.24

5.17

6.37

3 stars (%)

7.97

17.16

7.20

20.01

7.03

16.23

7.50

17.37

4 stars (%)

18.60

37.52

13.72

35.91

15.12

33.72

16.52

35.71

5 stars (%)

60.05

37.31

67.99

34.05

63.52

40.99

62.64

38.09

We analyze the difference between the average ratings of organic reviews and that of
incentivized reviews by conducting t-tests. The results are presented in Tables 3 and 4. On
average, vendor-initiated incentivized reviews have a rating of 4.74/5.00 and organic reviews
have a rating of 4.35/5.00. The results show that the ratings of vendor-initiated incentivized
reviews are significantly higher than those for organic reviews (difference = .391, p < .001). In
contrast, platform-initiated incentivized reviews receive lower ratings than organic reviews.
Specifically, platform-initiated incentivized reviews have an average rating of 4.01/5.00, while
organic reviews receive that of 4.20/5.00 (difference = -.197, p < .001). The results are consistent
across the three categories. Overall, we confirm that vendor (platform) – initiated incentivized
reviewers post more positive (negative) reviews than organic reviewers.
Table 3
Comparison of Means by Review Type
Vendor-Initiated Incentivized Reviews
Product
Category

Number of
Products

Beauty

921

Grocery

129

Health and
Personal Care

1,269

Overall

2,319

Review
Type
Organic
Incentivized
Organic
Incentivized
Organic
Incentivized
Organic
Incentivized

Number of
Observations
83,005
1,213
22,438
167
72,101
1,577
177,544
2,957

Notes: *** represents the significance level at the 1%.

18

Average
Rating
4.378
4.720
4.512
4.719
4.258
4.753
4.346
4.737

Standard
Deviation
1.144
.639
.989
.719
1.258
.594
1.177
.620

Difference

t-Value

.341***

10.373

.207***

2.698

.495***

15.583

.391***

18.025

Table 4
Comparison of Means by Review Type
Platform-Initiated Incentivized Reviews
Product
Category

Number of
Products

Beauty

1,162

Grocery

625

Health and
Personal Care

1,265

Overall

3,052

Review
Type
Organic
Incentivized
Organic
Incentivized
Organic
Incentivized
Organic
Incentivized

Number of
Observations
188,384
33,309
67,224
16,612
146,100
32,026
401,708
81,947

Average
Rating
4.172
4.021
4.321
3.913
4.188
4.038
4.203
4.006

Standard
Deviation
1.260
.982
1.192
1.033
1.302
1.037
1.266
1.015

Difference

t-Value

-.151***

20.772

-.407***

40.437

-.150***

19.296

-.197***

41.8445

Notes: *** represents the significance level at the 1%.

3.3 Discussion
In this chapter, we examine the nature of biases in incentivized reviews. We find that
vendor-initiated incentivized reviews have higher ratings than organic reviews. Therefore, they
have the potential of misleading customers and putting businesses that do not incentivize their
reviewers at a disadvantage. Realizing these pitfalls, most platforms, such as Amazon.com,
Google, and Yelp, have banned incentivized reviews by imposing financial and/or reputational
penalties on violators. It is, however, difficult for platforms to police vendors due to the sheer
volume of online reviews. Amazon.com, for example, carries 600 million products, with each
product having hundreds of reviews.
Industry studies have found that even after the ban, many vendors at Amazon.com
continue to incentivize their reviewers (Dwoskin and Timberg 2018). The fact that despite
platforms like Amazon.com, Google, etc., banning such practices, many vendors continue to
incentivize their reviewers would suggest that some businesses think it is a profitable strategy.
But is it? This is what we seek to answer with this research.
Interestingly, while Amazon.com discontinued most incentivized online reviews, they
retained incentivized online reviews from “expert” reviewers called Vine reviews. These
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reviewers are selected based on their reviewer rank, which is a reflection of the quality and
helpfulness of their reviews as judged by other customers on the platform (Amazon.com 2019).
According to Amazon.com (2019), such reviews offer the independent opinions of the Vine
reviewers as the vendors cannot influence, modify or edit the reviews. The purpose of the
program is to provide customers with honest and unbiased feedback from some of the most
trusted reviewers. However, we find that platform-initiated incentivized reviews are negatively
biased when compared to organic reviews.
In the following chapter, we develop a set of hypotheses to test how such biases in
incentivized reviews affect the nature of subsequent organic (i.e., non-incentivized) reviews.
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CHAPTER 4
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Although the number of incentivized reviews has dramatically increased over recent
years, none of the previous studies of online reviews has examined how incentivized reviews
affect subsequent customers. We draw on expectation-confirmation theory (Oliver 1980) to
develop a conceptual understanding of incentivized reviews on subsequent organic review
ratings. We next briefly describe the expectation-confirmation theory and then develop our
hypotheses.

4.1 Expectation-Confirmation Theory
The process of a consumer’s product evaluation involves pre-purchase and post-purchase
evaluations separated in time by the consumer’s purchase of and direct experience with the
product (Anderson and Sullivan 1993; Kuksov and Xie 2010). Consumers form pre-purchase
evaluations based on publicly available information, such as marketing mix activities and WOM.
These pre-purchase evaluations reflect consumer’s expectations of the product, and as a result,
they provide a benchmark against which the actual product experience is compared (Anderson
and Sullivan 1993). In the post-purchase stage, a consumer forms post-purchase evaluation based
on the new information that he or she gains from the actual performance of the product. The
expectation-confirmation theory (Oliver 1980) states that if the actual performance meets one’s
expectations, confirmation is formed and the consumer is satisfied, whereas if the perceived
performance falls short of expectation, disconfirmation results and the consumer is dissatisfied.
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Online organic reviews provide feedback about the actual experiences of consumers with
brands in a variety of product categories and subcategories. Online organic reviews are like a
pure-form exemplification of consumer generated content (CGC). In the nondigital age, CGCs in
the form of WOM have traditionally been more impactful because the source is viewed as more
credible (Day 1971). WOM-type CGCs also influences consumer expectations (Zeithaml, Berry,
and Parasuraman 1993). Like other forms of CGCs, online organic reviews of the digital age are
also considered to provide reliable and trustworthy information. Online organic reviews are thus
helpful while making consumer purchase decisions. Feedback from the trade (Hoeffler 2018) and
academic studies (Floyd et al. 2014; Mudambi and Schuff 2010) indicate the existence of this
trend. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the content of organic reviews provides accurate
information about the true quality of the products purchased and reviewed. One would therefore
expect the organic online reviews to lead to the formation of true consumer expectations.
Normally, this should match the product performance that a consumer would witness after
purchase and consumption.
Hoeffler (2018) describes a study in which a majority of their 3,000 respondents find
organic reviews and incentivized reviews to be equally credible. Hence, due to consumers’
inability to discern between organic and incentivized reviews, we would expect potential
consumers to find incentivized reviews as worthy of trust as organic reviews. If incentivized
reviews happen to be biased or inaccurate, their insertion into a product's reviews would bias the
product ratings and reviews, leading to the formation of biased consumer expectations.
A positive bias would lead to artificially raising consumer expectations, setting
consumers for future disillusionment. This will happen because consumer expectations (as built
up by the incentivized reviews) about the supposedly true product quality will not match the
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actual product quality experienced by the product buyers. On the contrary, a negative bias would
lower consumer expectations and subsequently improve satisfaction among consumers because
the product performance would exceed consumer expectations (weighed down by negative
incentivized reviews). The size of bias would be the difference between the rating of an
incentivized review and the average rating of organic reviews posted before the incentivized
review.

4.2 Vendor-Initiated Incentivized Review
Since vendor-initiated incentivized reviews tend to praise products being reviewed and
have overwhelmingly higher ratings than organic reviews, subsequent consumers are more likely
to form higher expectations about the product. These higher expectations may lower the
consumer’s post-purchase evaluation if the product falls short of expectations. Therefore,
subsequent reviewers are more likely to engage in disconfirmation behavior by posting negative
reviews. This will lead to dissatisfaction and, we suggest, to a lower level of evaluation of
organic reviews posted after the vendor-initiated incentivized review. This leads us to our first
hypothesis H1a .We express the hypothesis as:
H1a: A vendor-initiated incentivized review will lower subsequent organic review ratings
if it has a higher rating than the prevailing rating of the previous organic reviews.

4.3 Platform-Initiated Incentivized Reviews
Platforms select incentivized reviewers based on several criteria but mainly on their
review rank which is a reflection of the quality and helpfulness of their reviews judged by other
customers. Therefore, the chosen reviewers are more active and highly involved in the online
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community. Prior studies have found that expert reviewers are more likely to post negative
opinions (Goes, Lin, and Yeung 2014; Moe and Schweidel 2012; Schlosser 2005). According to
Moe and Schweidel (2012), highly active reviewers are more negative in their evaluations. In an
experimental setting, Schlosser (2005) demonstrates that reviewers strive to differentiate their
reviews, and negative reviews are more differentiated because negative evaluations are perceived
as more intelligent (Amabile and Glazebrook 1982; Amabile 1983). Goes, Lin, and Yeung
(2014) suggest that reviewers are more likely to post a negative rating when they receive higher
social recognition. They also propose that as reviewers become more popular and gain higher
social recognition by other customers, they are more likely to provide a negative rating because
posting negative reviews makes them look like experts.
Hence, the expected quality of the product as perceived by the potential consumer would
be low after he or she reads a platform-initiated incentivized review. The actual product quality
of the purchased product as experienced by potential customers is likely to be higher than this
expected quality level, which will lead to customer satisfaction. Therefore, subsequent reviewers
are more likely to post positive organic reviews. This leads us to hypothesis H1b.
H1b: A platform-initiated incentivized review will raise the subsequent organic review
ratings if it has a lower rating than the prevailing rating of the previous organic reviews.

4.4 Review Helpfulness
To provide reliable recommendations, major online retailers, including Amazon.com,
incorporate mechanisms designed to control the quality of product reviews. For example, they
allow users to vote on the helpfulness of other users’ reviews. If a potential customer reads a
review and finds it helpful, he or she can vote for it. If someone else reads the review and finds it
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unhelpful, he or she can vote against it. Overall helpfulness of the review then determines the
rank of the review to be displayed on each product’s page. Most online retailers display each
product’s reviews in the order of helpfulness. Therefore, a review with more helpful votes carries
more weight in the minds of potential customers.
Review helpfulness refers to a customer’s attitude towards the information conveyed in a
review by another customer (Baek, Ahn, and Choi. 2012; Mudambi and Schuff 2010; Pan and
Zhang 2011; Yin, Zhang, and Li 2014). It reflects customers’ perceived value of the information
that helps reduce their uncertainties and risks when considering a potential purchase and assists
them in their decision-making processes. Previous research finds that reviews viewed as helpful
by other customers have a stronger influence on the purchase decisions than unhelpful reviews
(Tormala and Rucker 2007). If a review is viewed as helpful, it increases the ability of potential
customers to assess the quality of the product and reduce purchase errors.
Reviews that are more in-depth or that contain more arguments are perceived as more
helpful (Mudambi and Schuff 2010; Willemsen et al. 2011) and thus allow potential customers to
predict how much they will like the reviewed product with greater certainty. Thus, we expect
that the negative (positive) effect of a vendor (platform) –initiated incentivized review on the
subsequent organic review ratings would be less pronounced if the content of the incentivized
review is viewed as more helpful. This leads to hypotheses H2a(b).
H2a(b) :The negative (positive) effect of the vendor (platform) –initiated incentivized
review on the subsequent organic review ratings would be less pronounced if the
incentivized review is viewed as more helpful.
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4.5 Product Types
Nelson (1970; 1974) proposes the classification of products into search and experience
goods based on consumers’ ability to discover product quality before purchase. Search products
are those for which consumers can obtain information on product quality prior to purchase, while
experience products are those that require actual purchase in order to evaluate product quality
(Nelson 1970). Examples of search products include cameras, cell phones, and printers;
examples of experience products are video games, movies, and music.
The main reason for consumers to read online reviews from other customers prior to
purchase is to reduce purchase uncertainty. Perceived quality of a search product can be
objectively compared and evaluated, while that of an experience product is subjectively
compared and evaluated with more difficulty (Huang, Lurie, and Mitra 2009). In general,
information about search attributes is typically presented in a straightforward manner and should
require less time to obtain, whereas obtaining information about experience attributes may
involve reading consumer reviews and ratings. Therefore, the difference between search and
experience products should influence consumer’s reliance on other consumers’ reviews.
Nelson (1970) predicts that the recommendations of others will be used more and have
greater impact for purchases of experience products than search products. Huang, Lurie, and
Mitra (2009) find that the presence of product reviews from other consumers have a greater
impact on consumer search and purchase behavior for experience products than for search
products. Further, they find that experience products involve greater depth (time per page) and
lower breadth (total number of pages) of search than search products. Thus, online reviews could
be more useful in reducing the risk of purchasing experience goods than search goods. The
conclusion we take from these results is that the negative (positive) effect of a vendor (platform)
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– initiated incentivized reviews on subsequent organic review ratings would be more pronounced
for experience products than for search products. This leads to hypotheses H3a(b).
H3a(b) :The negative (positive) effect of the vendor (platform) – initiated incentivized
review on the subsequent organic review ratings would be more pronounced for
experience products than for search products.
Figure 3 illustrates the conceptual model of this research.

Figure 3
Conceptual Model

H1

Incentivized Review
Bias

H2

Subsequent Organic
Review Ratings

H3

Helpfulness of
Incentivized Review

Product Type
Search or Experience
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CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
5.1 Data
We collect data from Amazon.com’s Web Service (AWS). For vendor-initiated
incentivized reviews, we use product reviews posted from January 1, 2012 to August 31, 2015.
For platform-initiated incentivized reviews, we collect product reviews posted after the Vine
program was launched. Specifically, we use reviews posted from August 1, 2007 to August 31,
2015. We collect reviews for some search and experience products that are classified based on
Nelson’s categorization (1970; 1974). For search products, we collect reviews from four
categories: (a) clothing, shoes, and jewelry; (b) sport and patio, (c) lawn and garden, and (d)
toys. For experience products, we gather reviews from another three categories: (a) beauty, (b)
health and personal care, and (c) grocery and gourmet food.
For each product, we obtain all the posted review texts, dates, ratings, and votes on
helpfulness. Using computer-aided text analysis (CATA) and manual coding of the online review
text as described in Chapter 3, we then identify vendor-initiated incentivized reviews as ones that
have a disclosure indicating that the reviewer was provided the product for free or at a
discounted price in exchange for a review. For platform-initiated incentivized reviews, we select
reviews that include a label, “Amazon Vine Review,” which indicates that the review was
written for the Vine program.
Since it is difficult to ascertain the impact of each incentivized review in cases where
there are more than one, we limit our sample to products that have only one incentivized review.
We remove items that do not have any reviews posted before or after the incentivized review.
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These considerations result in a data set of 180,267 reviews, with 132,933 reviews from 1,710
experience products, and 47,334 reviews from 1,107 search products.

5.2 Dependent and Independent Variables
Our dependent measure is RATINGij , the rating assigned by reviewer i to product j. The
best rating is a five-star rating, and the worst is a one-star rating. We next describe the
independent variables.
Incentivized review bias (INCENT BIAS). We used the difference between the rating of
an incentivized review and the average rating of previously posted organic reviews to measure
the potential degree of bias in the incentivized review relative to organic reviews. The larger the
difference, the more favorable (unfavorable) the vendor (platform) – initiated incentivized
review is.
Incentivized review helpfulness (INCENT REV HELP). The helpfulness of an
incentivized review is measured by the percentage of customers who find the review helpful.
This is derived by dividing the number of customers who voted that the incentivized review was
helpful by the total votes in response to the “was this reviews helpful to you” question. Figure 4
shows an example of the question on Amazon.com.
Figure 4
Review Helpfulness on Amazon.com
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Product type (PROD TYPE). Product type is coded as a binary variable, with the value of
0 for search products and 1 for experience products.

5.3 Control Variables
Previous research suggests that review ratings change systematically over both order and
time (Godes and Silva 2012; Li and Hitt 2008; Wu and Huberman 2008). Specifically, Godes
and Silva (2012) find that ratings become increasingly negative as more reviews arrive when
controlling for time. Since our focus is on measuring the impact of previously posted
incentivized review on subsequent ratings, we must account for both processes. To control for
the impact of sequential and temporal dynamics (Godes and Silva 2012), we include the variable
ORDER ij , which captures the position of a review from reviewer i in the sequence of reviews for
a given product j, and the variable TIME, which captures how much time has elapsed since the
first review.
Reviewer average (REV AVG). Some reviewers tend to be more positive or negative than
others when assigning ratings to products (Godes and Silva 2012; Peng et al. 2019). We control
for observed reviewer-level heterogeneity via REV AVGij , which captures the average rating of
all the reviewer i’s reviews on products in the same category other than j.
Review length (REV LEN). Godes and Silva (2012) find that long reviews are likely to be
more negative than short reviews. Thus, we control for the length of the written review by REV
LEN, which measures the number of words in the incentivized review.
Total helpfulness votes received by the incentivized review (INCENT HELP VOTE). We
also include the total number of votes on each incentivized review’s helpfulness as a control
variable. Since we measure helpfulness of an incentivized review as a percentage, this could hide
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some potentially important information. For example, “8 out of 10 people found the review
helpful” may have a different impact on the subsequent ratings than “80 out of 100 people found
the review helpful” (Mudambi and Schuff 2010). Table 5 summarizes the variables and the
measures.
Table 5
Variables and Measures
Variable
1. Rating
2. Incent Bias
3. Order
4. Time
5. Rev Len
6. Rev Avg
7. Incent Help Vote
8. Incent Rev Help
9. Prod Type

Measure
Online product rating for a product by a reviewer
The difference between the rating of an incentivized review and the average rating of
previously posted organic reviews
The position of a review in the sequence of reviews for a given product
The time that has elapsed since the first review
The length of the written review, in number of words.
The average rating of all of a reviewer’s reviews on products other than a given
product
The number of total helpfulness votes received by an incentivized review
The number of helpfulness votes divided by the total number of votes received by an
incentivized review
0 for search products; 1 for experience products

5.4 Model Specification
Since our dependent variable is a discrete ordinal response, we employ the ordered-logit
model to measure consumer evaluation. Let Uij be the underlying latent variable that captures the
reviewer i’s evaluation of product j. The ordered logit model is as follows:

(1) Uij = β1 INCENT BIASij + β2 INCENT BIASij × INCENT REV HELPij
+ β3 INCENT BIAS ij × PROD TYPEij + β4 ORDER ij + β5 TIMEij + β6 REV LENij
+ β7 REV AVGij + β8 INCENT HELP VOTEij + β9 INCENT REV HELPij
+ β10 PROD TYPEij + β11 YEAR ij + δw MONTHij + εij

In Equation 1, β1 is the main effect of INCENT BIASij on reviewer i’s online rating of
product j. The hypothesized moderation effects of INCENT REV HELPij and PROD TYPEij are
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given by the coefficients β2 and β3 , respectively. The effects of the control variables are given
by the coefficients β4 to β10. δw is the fixed effect of different months in a year. The effect of
the calendar year when a review was posted is captured by the coefficient β11.
The model is estimated via maximum likelihood where a set of four cutoff values μk , k ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4} is estimated, and the discrete ordered response RATINGij is generated based on where
the latent evaluation Uij falls within the cutoffs:
RATINGij = 1 ⇔ Uij < μ1 ,
RATINGij = k ∈ {2,3,4} ⇔ Uij ∈ [μk−1 , μk ],
RATINGij = 5 ⇔ Uij ≥ μ4
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Summary Statistics and Correlations
Table 6
Descriptive Statistics
Vendor-Initiated Incentivized Products
M

SD

Min

Max

1

2

3

4

5

6

1. Rating

4.363

1.144

1

5

1

2. Incent Bias

.214

.668

-4

4

-.092*

1

3. Order

262.860

411.794

3

2967

-.021*

.039*

1

4. Time

266.965

244.572

2

1308

-.071*

.180*

.554*

1

5. Rev Len

53.339

73.888

0

2217

.065*

-.032*

-.118*

-.132*

1

6. Rev Avg
7. Incent Help
Vote

4.388

.780

1

5

.340*

-.038*

-.071*

-.090*

.083*

1

8.027

26.712

0

836

-.004

.047*

-.016*

-.072*

-.002

.005

1

8. Incent Rev Help

.596

.451

0

1

.011*

.002

-.111*

-.116*

.043*

.010*

.183*

1

9. Prod Type

.744

.436

0

1

-.021*

.026*

.181*

.083*

-.025*

.002

.113*

.059*

Notes: Correlations above are significant at p < .10 and above.
Incent Bias vendor−initiated = (Incentivized Rating) – (Average of Previous Ratings)
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7

8

9

1

Table 7
Descriptive Statistics
Platform- Initiated Incentivized Products
M

SD

Min

Max

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1. Rating

4.202

.986

1

5

1

2. Incent Bias

.027

1.093

-4

3.429

.137*

1

3. Order

79.434

105.054

3

1542

.131*

-.011

1

4. Time

450.889

638.359

2

3145

.112*

.111*

.561*

1

5. Rev Len

119.950

112.368

0

2325

-.106*

-.032*

-.209*

-.230*

1

6. Rev Avg
7. Incent Help
Vote
8. Incent Rev
Help

4.175

.479

1

5

.314*

.041*

.142*

.162*

-.106*

1

1.751

6.589

0

100

.025*

.075*

-.063*

.018*

.006

.028*

1

.316

.415

0

1

-.002

.155*

-.108*

.130*

.035*

.024*

.341*

1

9. Prod Type

.783

.412

0

1

-.109*

.023*

-.262*

-.283*

.030*

-.136*

-.106*

-.026*

9

1

Notes: Correlations above are significant at p < .10 and above.
Incent Bias platform−initiated = (Average of Previous Ratings) – (Vine Rating)

Tables 6 and 7 report the summary statistics and the correlation matrix of the major
variables in the full data set by incentivized review type. Note that for an intuitive interpretation
purpose, we subtract the average rating of the previous organic reviews from an incentivized
review rating for each product when we construct INCENT BIAS for each of the vendor–
initiated incentivized products. For platform–initiated incentivized products, we subtract the
average rating of the previous organic reviews from the rating of a platform–initiated
incentivized review.
For vendor–initiated incentivized reviews, INCENT BIAS has an average value of .214.
This means that vendor-initiated incentivized reviews have higher ratings than the average rating
of organic reviews posted before the vendor-initiated incentivized review. For the platforminitiated incentivized reviews, INCENT BIAS has an average value of .027. This finding
suggests that platform-initiated incentivized reviewers in general post more negative ratings than
the previous organic reviewers. The difference between the average rating of the previous
organic reviews and the rating of a vendor (platform) –initiated incentivized review is
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significantly negatively (positively) correlated with the average rating of subsequent organic
review ratings (r vendor−initiated = -.092, p < .001; r platform−initiated = .137, p < .001).

Table 8
Fraction of Star Ratings of Vendor-Initiated Incentivized Reviews
Organic
Star Rating

Incentivized

Search

Experience

Overall

Search

Experience

Overall

1 star (%)

5.14

7.31

6.77

.22

.56

.43

2 stars (%)

3.62

4.02

3.92

.44

.56

.52

3 stars (%)

5.83

6.24

6.13

2.77

3.18

3.02

4 stars (%)

14.61

14.29

14.37

12.97

15.67

14.62

5 stars (%)

70.81

68.13

68.81

83.59

80.03

81.41

Average Stars

4.423

4.319

4.345

4.793

4.740

4.761

(1.093)

(1.210)

(1.182)

(.523)

(.598)

(.570)

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.

Table 9
Fraction of Star Ratings of Platform- Initiated Incentivized Reviews
Organic
Star Rating

Incentivized

Search

Experience

Overall

Search

Experience

Overall

1 star (%)

3.79

2.52

2.89

3.41

3.41

3.41

2 stars (%)

4.29

5.25

4.97

3.90

1.37

2.41

3 stars (%)

9.51

14.28

12.87

13.17

10.92

11.85

4 stars (%)

23.59

32.36

29.77

33.17

49.49

42.77

5 stars (%)

58.82

45.6

49.49

46.34

34.81

39.56

Average Stars

4.294

4.133

4.242

4.151

4.109

4.127

(1.053)

(1.001)

(.810)

(1.020)

(.900)

(.951)

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.

Tables 8 and 9 show the fraction of star ratings for both incentivized reviews and organic
reviews by incentivized review type. For both experience and search products, we find that
vendor-initiated incentivized reviews have fewer one-star rating reviews (.43% versus 6.77%)
and more five-star rating reviews (81.41% versus 68.81%) than organic reviews for the same
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products. Vendor-initiated incentivized reviews have an average rating of 4.761 and organic
reviews have an average rating of 4.345. Contrary to the distributions of the vendor-initiated
incentivized review ratings, platform-initiated incentivized reviews include far less extreme
positive (five-star) ratings (81.41% versus 39.56%). Overall, we find evidence that vendor
(platform) - initiated incentivized reviews have much higher (lower) ratings than organic
reviews.

5.5.2 Preliminary Results
Table 10
Comparison of Means by Review Type
Vendor- Initiated Incentivized Reviews
Review Type

Number of Observations

Organic
Incentivized

149,585
2,319

Average
Rating
4.345
4.761

Standard
Deviation
1.182
.570

Difference

t-Value

.415***

16.897

Notes: *** represents the significance level at the 1%.

Table 11
Comparison of Means by Review Type
Platform- Initiated Incentivized Reviews
Review Type

Number of Observations

Organic
Vine

27,865
498

Average
Rating
4.242
4.127

Standard
Deviation
.810
.951

Difference

t-Value

-.116***

3.143

Notes: *** represents the significance level at the 1%.

We analyze the difference between the average ratings of organic reviews and that of
incentivized reviews by conducting a t-test. The results are presented in Tables 10 and 11. On
average, vendor-initiated incentivized reviews have a rating of 4.76/5.00 and organic reviews
have a rating of 4.35/5.00. A t-test indicates that the ratings of vendor-initiated incentivized
reviews are significantly higher than those of organic reviews (difference = .415, p < .001). In
contrast, platform-initiated incentivized reviews have lower ratings than organic reviews
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(difference = -.116, p < .001). Specifically, platform-initiated incentivized reviews have an
average rating of 4.13, while organic reviews receive that of 4.24. The results indicate that
vendor (platform) -initiated incentivized reviewers post more positive (negative) reviews than
organic reviewers.

Table 12
Comparison of Means by Product Category
Vendor- Initiated Incentivized Reviews
Product
Category

Number
of
Products

Number of
Observations
(Pre/Post)

Ave.
Rating of
Previous
Reviews

902

23,622/14,349

Experience

1,417

72,172/39,442

Overall

2,319

95,794/53,791

4.582
(.555)
4.496
(.567)
4.530
(.564)

Search

Average
rating of
Incentivized
Reviews
4.793
(.523)
4.740
(.598)
4.761
(.570)

Average
Rating of
Post
Reviews
4.425
(.705)
4.316
(.710)
4.358
(.710)

Difference
between
Pre and
Post
Reviews
-.157***

tvalue

-.181***

9.292

-.172***

11.051

Difference
between
Pre and
Post
Reviews
.187***

tvalue

6.121

Notes: 1) *** represents the significance level at the 1%.
2) Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.

Table 13
Comparison of Means by Product Category
Platform- Initiated Incentivized Reviews
Product
Category

Number
of
Products

Number of
Observations
(Pre/Post)

Ave.
Rating of
Previous
Reviews

Average
rating of Vine
Reviews

Average
Rating of
Post
Reviews

Search

205

4,858/3,398

Experience

293

8,557/11,052

Overall

498

13,415 /14,450

4.216
(1.122)
4.114
(1.030)
4.151
(1.065)

4.151
(1.020)
4.109
(.900)
4.127
(.950)

4.402
(.945)
4.146
(.994)
4.206
(.989)

7.927

.032**

2.180

.055***

4.491

Notes: 1) ***, ** represent the significance levels at the 1%, and 5%, respectively.
2) Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.

We then compare the average rating of reviews posted prior to incentivized reviews to
that of reviews posted after incentivized reviews. Tables 12 and 13 summarize the results.
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Overall, we find that organic reviews posted prior to vendor-initiated incentivized reviews
receive an average rating of 4.53/5.00 and reviews posted after incentivized reviews receive an
average rating of 4.36/5.00 (difference = -.172, p < .001). Organic reviews posted prior to
platform-initiated incentivized reviews receive an average rating of 4.15/5.00 and reviews posted
after incentivized reviews receive an average rating of 4.21/5.00 on average (difference = .055, p
< .001). These findings indicate that vendor (platform) –initiated incentivized reviews lower
(increase) future organic review ratings.
We compare the effect of incentivized review on future ratings for both search and
experience products. Tables 12 and 13 show the t-test results for both experience and search
goods by incentivized review type. For vendor-initiated incentivized reviews of search products,
previous reviews receive an average rating of 4.58/5.00, whereas post reviews receive an average
rating of 4.43/5.00 (difference = -.157, p < .001). For vendor-initiated incentivized reviews of
experience products, reviews posted prior to incentivized reviews receive an average rating of
4.50/5.00, whereas reviews posted after incentivized reviews receive an average rating of
4.32/5.00 (difference = -.181, p < .001).
For platform-initiated incentivized reviews, we find the opposite results. The prior
reviews of search products have an average rating of 4.22/ 5.00, whereas the post reviews receive
an average rating of 4.40/5.00 (difference = .187, p < .001). Similarly, the prior reviews of
experience products receive an average rating of 4.11/5.00, whereas the post reviews receive an
average rating of 4.15/5.00 (difference = .032, p < .05). Overall, we find that the subsequent
reviews of a platform–initiated incentivized review have a higher average rating than that of the
previously posted reviews (difference = .055, p < .001). We interpret these findings as evidence
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that vendor (platform) - initiated incentivized reviews are more likely to have a negative
(positive) effect on subsequent organic review ratings (p < .001).

5.5.3 Model Selection
In our data set, 10,493 out of 68,241 of reviews posted after incentivized reviews are
provided by reviewers who author only a single review. Inclusion of REV AVG causes
discarding 10,493 unique observations. Given how many reviews are discarded, we assess the
robustness of our results via an additional specification. In Model 1, we estimate the effects of
incentivized reviews on our entire data set. This requires us to drop the REV AVG variable.
Model 2 presents the full model with the inclusion of the effects of reviewer-level heterogeneity.
The coefficient estimate for REV AVG suggests that a reviewer’s individual rating tendency has
a great deal of explanatory power. Some reviewers assign systematically higher ratings to their
products than do others (β7,

vendor−initiated

= .867, p < .001; β7,

platform−initiated

= 1.355, p

< .001). Model 2 shows significantly improved fit over Model 1 (∆deviance−vendor = 26,984.64,
d. f. = 1, 𝑝 < .01; ∆deviance−platform = 2,065.52, d. f. = 1, 𝑝 < .01). Thus, we use the results
of Model 2 for hypotheses testing.
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Table 14
Estimation Results
Ordered Logistic Regression of Rating

Hypotheses
Incent Bias
Incent
Bias×Incent Rev
Help
Incent Bias× Prod
Type

H1𝑎 (-), H1𝑏 (+)

H2𝑎 (+), H2𝑏 (-)

H3𝑎 (-), H3𝑏 (+)

Order
Time
Rev Len

Vendor- Initiated
Incentivized Reviews
Model 1
Model 2
Parameter
Parameter
Estimate (SE)
Estimate (SE)
-.357***
-.302***
(.034)
(.038)
.228***
(.034)

.147***
(.038)

-.099**
(.047)

-.121**
(.048)

-.054*
(.032)
2.010E-04***
(2.680E-05)
-3.818E-04***
(4.590E-05)
.001***
(1.421E-04)

-.061*
(.037)
2.269E-04***
(3.180E-05)
-2.776E-04***
(5.250E-05)
4.596E-04***
(1.483E-04)
.867***
(.013)
-.001
(3.883E-04)
.041
(.026)
-.086***
(.027)
Included
Included
43,639
-41,790.98
83,635.96

.170***
(.045)
.002***
(2.614E-04)
1.407E-04***
(3.530E-05)
-.001***
(1.465E-04)

.149***
(.047)
.002***
(3.034E-04)
5.230E-05
(3.650E-05)
-.001***
(1.487E-04)
1.355***
(.038)
.007**
(.003)
-.123***
(.047)
-.267***
(.047)
Included
Included
14,109
-15,798.96
31,663.92

Rev Avg
Incent Help Vote
Incent Rev Help
Prod Type
Year dummies
Month dummies
Number of Observations
LL
AIC

Notes:

Platform- Initiated
Incentivized Reviews
Model 1
Model 2
Parameter
Parameter
Estimate (SE)
Estimate (SE)
.175***
.200***
(.046)
(.048)

-.001**
(3.367E-04)
-.002
(.023)
-.049**
(.026)
Included
Included
53,791
-55,284.287
110,620.6

.008***
(.003)
-.080*
(.045)
-.357***
(.044)
Included
Included
14,450
-16,832.72
33,729.44

1) ***, **, * represent the significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
2) Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
3) Incent Bias vendor−initiated = (Incentivized Rating) – (Average of Previous Ratings)
Incent Bias platform−initiated = (Average of Previous Ratings) – (Vine Rating)
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Table 15
Robustness Check

Ordered Logistic Regression of Rating

Hypotheses
Incent Bias

H1𝑎 (-), H1𝑏 (+)

Incent Bias×Incent Rev Help

H2𝑎 (+), H2𝑏 (-)

Incent Bias× Prod Type

H3𝑎 (-), H3𝑏 (+)

Order
Time
Rev Len
Rev Avg
Incent Help Vote
Incent Rev Help
Prod Type
Year dummies
Month dummies
Number of Observations
LL
AIC

Notes:

Vendor- Initiated
Incentivized Reviews
Model 2
Parameter Estimate (SE)
-.417***
(.055)
.255***
(.050)
-.097**
(.049)
1.856E-04***
(3.450E-05)
-2.408E-04***
(6.460E-05)
-7.190E-05
(2.138E-04)
.824***
(.017)
-.001
(4.402E-04)
.071**
(.035)
-.044
(.038)
Included
Included
25,505
-24,941.962
49,937.92

Platform- Initiated
Incentivized Reviews
Model 2
Parameter Estimate (SE)
.213***
(.049)
-.124***
(.048)
.137***
(.047)
.002***
(3.110E-04)
4.960E-05
(3.660E-05)
-.001***
(1.503E-04)
1.370***
(.038)
.007**
(.003)
-.120***
(.047)
-.271***
(.047)
Included
Included
14,009
-15,678.92
31,423.84

1) ***, ** represent the significance levels at the 1% and 5%, respectively.
2) Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
3) Incent Bias vendor−initiated = (Incentivized Rating) – (Average of Previous Ratings)
Incent Bias platform−initiated = (Average of Previous Ratings) – (Vine Rating)
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5.5.4 Estimation Results
Table 14 presents the estimation results of the empirical model (Equation 1). We first
discuss the vendor-initiated incentivized review results and then the platform-initiated
incentivized review results, followed by similarities/differences between the two.
Hypotheses testing. To test H1a, we examine the effect of the difference between the
average rating of previous reviews and the rating of a vendor-initiated incentivized review. We
find a significant negative effect of INCENT BIAS on subsequent organic review ratings
(β1,

vendor−initiated

= -.302, p < .001). This suggests that a vendor-initiated incentivized review

attracts more negative reviews if it has a higher rating than the prevailing rating of the previous
organic reviews, lending support to H1a.
In H2a, we hypothesize a positive moderating effect of the helpfulness of a vendorinitiated incentivized review on subsequent organic review ratings. The interaction between
INCENT BIAS and INCENT REV HELP has a positive and significant effect on RATING
(β2,

vendor−initiated

= .147, p < .001). Hence, H2a is supported.

The results also provide strong support for H3a, which hypothesizes that the product type
moderates the effect of an incentivized review on subsequent organic review ratings. The
negative interaction term between INCENT BIAS and PROC TYPE indicates that INCENT BIAS
has a more negative effect on the subsequent review ratings for experience products than for
search products (β3,vendor−initiated = -.061, p < .10). This supports H3a.
Control variables. We find the sequential and temporal dynamic effects on subsequent
organic review ratings. Specifically, we find positive sequential dynamics, suggesting that
subsequent organic review ratings increase over sequence of reviews (β4,

vendor−initiated

= .0002269, p < .001). We also find negative temporal dynamics that subsequent organic review
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ratings decrease over time even after controlling for review order and calendar-time
(β5,

vendor−initiated

= -.0002776, p < .001).

With respect to review characteristics, the review length has a positive and significant
effect on subsequent ratings (β6,

vendor−initiated

= .0004596, p < .001). In regard to reviewer-

level heterogeneity, we find that some reviewers have a strong tendency to assign higher ratings
than do others (β7,
(β8,

vendor−initiated

vendor−initiated

= .867, p < .001). We also find that incentivized help votes

= -.001, n.s.) and helpfulness of incentivized reviews (β9,

vendor−initiated

= .041, n.s) do not affect subsequent organic review ratings. Finally, we find that overall the
subsequent review ratings of experience products have lower ratings than that of search products
(β10,

vendor−initiated

= -.086, p < .001)

The results of the models with subsequent organic ratings of platform-initiated
incentivized reviews as the dependent measure appear in columns 3 and 4 of Table 14. The effect
of the difference between a platform-initiated incentivized review rating and the average rating
of the previous reviews on the subsequent ratings is consistent. For each product, we subtract the
rating of a platform-initiated incentivized review from the average rating of all the previous
organic reviews to construct INCENT BIAS. This is to provide intuitive interpretation of the
results.
We find that the lower the rating of a platform-initiated incentivized review is, the higher
is the rating of subsequent organic reviews (β1,

platform−initiated

= .200, p < .001). Therefore,

H1b is supported. The significant negative interaction of INCENT BIAS and INCENT REV
HELP suggests that the positive effect of INCENT BIAS is less pronounced when the
incentivized review is viewed as more helpful (β2,

platform−initiated

= -.121, p < .05). Hence, H2b

is supported. The positive interaction term between INCENT BIAS and PROC TYPE indicates that
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INCENT BIAS has a more positive effect on the subsequent organic review ratings for experience
products than for search products (β3,

platform−initiated

= 149, p < .001), lending support to H3b.

We also confirm that the findings are robust when products that have a minimum of 30 previous
organic reviews are used (see Table 15). Table 16 provides a summary of our key findings.

Table 16
Summary of Key Findings
Independent Variable
Incent Bias
Incent Bias×Incent Rev Help
Incent Bias × Prod Type

Incentivized Review Type
Vendor-Initiated
Platform-Initiated
+
(H1a )
(H1b )
+
(H2a )
(H2b )
+
(H3𝑎 )
(H3𝑏 )
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

6.1 Summary of Findings and Academic Contributions
In this research, we examine the effects of two types of incentivized reviews on
subsequent organic review ratings: vendor – initiated incentivized reviews and platform –
initiated incentivized reviews. Using online product reviews posted on Amazon.com, we find
that incentivized-reviews are systematically more biased than organic reviews. Specifically, we
confirm that vendor (platform) – initiated incentivized reviews have higher (lower) ratings than
organic reviews. Across seven product categories, we show that the average rating of organic
reviews posted after a vendor (platform) – initiated incentivized review is lower (higher) than the
prevailing rating of the previous organic reviews.
The above effects become more pronounced when the incentivized review is more
biased. In other words, the larger the difference between the rating of the vendor-initiated
incentivized review and the average rating of the previously posted organic reviews, the lower
the subsequent organic review ratings. The findings suggest that vendor-initiated incentivized
reviewers provide exaggerated positive reviews, thus misrepresenting the true quality of the
product. This in turn raises the expectations of subsequent consumers and leads them to engage
in disconfirmation behavior. In contrast, platform-initiated incentivized reviews increase the
subsequent organic review ratings as they lower the expectations of future customers, resulting in
higher post purchase evaluations.
Further, we show that the effect of an incentivized review on subsequent organic review
ratings is less pronounced if the review is viewed as more helpful. A helpful review reduces
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customers’ uncertainties and risks when buying the product and hence reduces purchase errors.
We also find a moderating effect of product type. Specifically, we demonstrate that the effect of
an incentivized review on subsequent ratings is greater for experience products than for search
products. This finding indicates that the reviews’ informational role becomes more salient in an
environment where reliance on other consumers’ reviews is high.
Since previous research has dedicated relatively little attention to different types of online
customer reviews, this research supports previous calls for improved understanding of the
effectiveness of incentivized reviews (Dost et al. 2019; You, Vadakkepatt, and Joshi 2015).
Despite the significant recent growth in the number of incentivized reviews, we do not know
enough about how they influence consumer decision making. The findings of our empirical
research demonstrate the distinct influences of the two types of incentivized reviews on
subsequent organic review ratings and shed light on how and when incentivized reviews affect
subsequent customers’ review-generation behavior.
This research contributes to the literature on social dynamics of product ratings. By
building on the foundation of expectation-confirmation theory (Oliver 1980), we empirically
show that positively (negatively) biased incentivized reviews lower (increase) subsequent
organic review ratings. While prior research has demonstrated the positive effects of free
samples on sales (Hu et al. 2010; Yao et al. 2017; Zhang, Goh, and Lin 2017) and the spillover
effects of sampling campaigns (Chae 2016), this study extends the research on product sampling
to online review generation, with respect to subsequent organic reviewers’ posting behavior.
Thus, this study enriches our understanding of sampling in online contexts by showing that
biased incentivized reviews may incorrectly signal the quality of the product and therefore
mislead potential customers.
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6.2 Managerial Implications
The central question to our research is: “Is it a good long-term business strategy to
incentivize reviewers?” Our analyses have provided clear answers to this important question.
Inclusion of vendor-initiated incentivized reviews that typically exaggerate the quality of
products should not be part of a business strategy. This is because they depress the ratings of
subsequent organic reviews as a result of disconfirmation between customer expectation and the
purchased product experience. These subsequent ratings will create a poor image of the product
in the minds of individuals reading the reviews.
In order to build a reputable and trustworthy platform for online customers, vendors
should more carefully match reviewers with free products. Our findings should motivate
platforms to increase their focus on finding the right customers to offer free products so that their
reviews truthfully reflect the true quality of the products. Both vendors and platforms should
look for reviewers who have offered more diverse and balanced opinions about their products.

6.3 Future Research
This work could be extended in several directions. In our research, we focus on numeric
values of incentivized review ratings. Future research could investigate textual content of
reviews when assessing the effectiveness of incentivized reviews. Further, it would be interesting
to examine the interaction of numeric values and textual content of incentivized reviews. Our
research could also be extended to include products that have multiple incentivized reviews. We
limit our samples to products that include a single incentivized review. It would be practical to
test whether the number of incentivized reviews moderates the effect.
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In addition, future research could compare the influence of incentivized reviews among
multiple products. While our analysis focuses on experience and search products, the results
could be applicable to multiple categories. For example, we expect online incentivized reviews
to have a greater impact on high-involvement products. Finally, future research could investigate
the effect of incentivized reviews on financial outcomes (e.g., sales). It would be interesting to
examine if favorable incentivized reviews can boost short-term sales.
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